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Abstract—Recent developments in cloud storage architectures
have originated new models of online storage as cooperative
storage systems and interconnected clouds. Such distributed
environments involve many organizations, thus ensuring confi-
dentiality becomes crucial: only legitimate clients should recover
the information they distribute among storage nodes.
In this work we present a unified framework for verifying con-
fidentiality of dispersal algorithms against probabilistic models
of intruders. Two models of intruders are given, corresponding
to different types of attackers: one aiming at intercepting as
many slices of information as possible, and the other aiming
at attacking the storage providers in the network. Both try to
recover the original information, given the intercepted slices.
By using probabilistic model checking, we can measure the
degree of confidentiality of the system exploring exhaustively
all possible behaviors. Our experiments suggest that dispersal
algorithms ensure a high degree of confidentiality against the
slice intruder, no matter the number of storage providers in the
system. On the contrary, they show a low level of confidentiality
against the provider intruder in networks with few storage
providers (e.g. interconnected cloud storage solutions).
Index Terms—probabilistic model checking, parameters, secu-
rity, confidentiality, information dispersal
I. MOTIVATION
Recently, the spreading of online storage services (such as
iCloud, Dropbox, Skydrive, etc.) has seen a huge increase.
According to the classical paradigm, the service provider buys
or rents a large number of servers in which authorized clients
are able to store their data. Recently, two other paradigms have
emerged, viz. cooperative storage services (CSS) and federated
(storage) clouds (FC).
In CSS, the storage capacity is provided directly by the
clients themselves who, co-operating in the cloud, make their
own storage facilities available to the others. This approach
offers some evident advantages: first of all the service provider
only needs a small number of servers, acting as coordinators
for the access to the service. Secondly, increasing the number
of users yields an increase of the storage capabilities. In this
context, data is stored by the users, each acting as a storage
server. In FC, organizations decide to agree on sharing their
resources for solving common tasks. In this scenario, data
is read from (and written to) several storage providers, each
managing its set of storage servers behinds its cloud.
A fundamental requirement of CSS and FC is confidential-
ity: only the legitimate client should be able to recover the
original information.
A consolidated solution to achieve confidentiality in such
contexts is based on data dispersal. Dispersal algorithms
provide a methodology for storing information in n distinct
pieces, or slices, (dispersed) across multiple locations, so that
redundancy protects the information in the event of a location
outage, but unauthorized access at any single location does not
provide usable information. Only the originator or a user which
has access to, at least, k out of the n slices distributed among
m available servers (or providers) can properly assemble and
recover the complete information, without the need of any pre-
shared encryption key. Instead, a client or attacker retrieving
a number of slices lower than k is not able to get any
information. This basic principle has been applied since the
pioneer works by Shamir [1] and Rabin [2], and subsequently
confirmed by McEliece and Sarwate [3] who disclosed the
relationship with Reed-Solomon (RS) coding schemes.
Dispersal algorithms based on RS schemes have optimal
performances, but they are subject to constraints due to the
algebraic nature of the codes which practically limit the
number of servers m, i.e., the level of dispersion. Since a
large number of servers is convenient both from the client
point of view (which can tolerate a greater number of failures)
and from the security point of view (since the attacker needs
to crack a larger number of nodes to steal the data), new
solutions based on the Luby transform (LT) codes for the
dispersal algorithm have been proposed [4]. These codes have
no limit, in principle, on the value of n. On the other side, a
characteristic feature of LT is that there are two thresholds k1
and k2 such that if an attacker has access to at least k1 slices
it has some probability of reconstructing the entire message,
while if it has access to at least k2 slices it has all the needed
information to reconstruct the message. For this reason, one
can see the RS coding schemes as special cases of LT.
Both coding schemes, RS and LT, can be combined with an
all-or-nothing-transform (AONT) [5] realising AONT-RS and
AONT-LT [6] data dispersal algorithms.
In this work we provide a unified formal framework to
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model check the mentioned dispersal algorithms against differ-
ent kinds of attackers trying to intercept slices and reconstruct
the original message. We use the tool PRISM [7] to verify
the degree of confidentiality of such algorithms. Since the
problem is intrinsically parametric, we also want to identify
suitable conditions under which the verification outcome holds
for any number of storage providers in the cloud. To this aim,
we repeatedly measured the probability of a confidentiality
attack to understand how it varies w.r.t. other parameters, and
in particular when the number of slices n increases.
Two different types of intruder are analyzed: the first one
can eavesdrop the slices traveling to a server without interfer-
ing with the communication. The second type of intruder can
violate some providers and retrieve all the slices they store.
Both intruders are assumed to be passive and probabilistic,
meaning that they can only read the exchanged information,
and probabilities affect their capability of taking any action.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II
defines the modeling languages and the models used for our
analysis; Section III shows the formal analysis allowing us to
measure the probability of an attack; Section IV comments
the experimental data; Section V compares our work with the
existing literature, while Section VI summarizes our results.
II. MODELING
Here, we formally describe a client process and two types of
intruder. The main client responsibility is sending a sequence
of slices to several distinct storage servers, following the
specific dispersal algorithm. The set of slices constitutes the
message. A message includes an actual content, viz. message
body, and some extra information, viz. message payload,
containing, among other things, the replicated information
allowing to reconstruct the message body even in presence of
faulty storage nodes. The main responsibility for both types
of intruder is to intercept the traveling slices, and reconstruct
the message body. The key difference between them is that
the first type intercepts every slice independently from the
previous ones. The second type of intruder, on the other side,
attacks the storage providers and collect all the stored slices.
The actions of the intruders are probabilistic.
The following parameters affect the system behavior: n is
the number of slices that compose the message, m is the
number of storage providers (or servers) in the system, c
is the number of slices every server/provider can store, also
called capacity, k1 and k2 are two thresholds such that if the
attacker intercepts at least k1 slices it has some probability of
reconstructing the entire message body, while if it intercepts
at least k2 slices it has all the necessary information to
reconstruct the message body. Two series of probabilities are
used: ai is the probability of intercepting a slice traveling to
storage provider i, for the first attacker, and it is the probability
of attacking the storage provider i, for the second attacker; xj
is the probability of reconstructing the entire message body,
given j slices have been intercepted by the attacker. The
relation among parameters are the following: k1 ≤ k2 ≤ n
and n ≤ m · c. Probabilities ai are defined for i ∈ [1,m],
while probabilities xj are defined for j ∈ [k1, n] and is such
that: ∀j ∈ [k1, k2 − 1]. 0 < xj < 1 and ∀j ∈ [k2, n]. xj = 1.
Also: ∀j ∈ [k1, n]. xj ≤ xj+1.
A. The system
Markov Decision Processes, or MDP for short, is a for-
malism allowing the definition of systems with probabilistic
and non-deterministic actions. They are thus recognized as
a good means to model randomized distributed systems: each
process is described by its probabilistic transition function, and
processes are interleaved by a non-deterministic scheduler . We
briefly introduce MDPs using Baier and Katoen’s notation [8].
Definition 1 (Markov Decision Process). Assume a finite set
of atomic propositions AP. A Markov decision process is a
tuple M = (S,Act, P r, ι, L) where:
• S = {s1, s2, . . .} is a finite set of states,
• Act = {α1, α2, . . .} is a finite set of actions,
• Pr : S × Act × S → [0, 1] is a probabilistic transition
function such that
∑
s′∈S Pr(s, α, s
′) ∈ {0, 1}, for all
s ∈ S and α ∈ Act;
• ι : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution probability of
states, such that
∑
s∈S ι(s) = 1;
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function.
We write (s, α, p, s′) ∈ Pr whenever Pr(s, α, s′) = p, for
some suitable states s, s′, action α and probability p > 0. We
call transition any such tuple.
If the MDP is in state s, an action α is enabled if
(s, α, p, s′) ∈ Pr, for some state s′ and probability p. If an
action α is enabled, than the probabilities among α-transitions
must form a probability distribution:
∑
s′∈S Pr(s, α, s
′) = 1.
More than one action can be enabled in the same state s, thus
the sum of probabilities of all transitions leaving state s sum
up to the number of enabled actions. Let us remark that while
probabilities in MDP could be real values, for algorithmic
purposes in this work we constrain them to be rational values.
In the following we make use of the uniform probability
distribution m : [1,m] → [0, 1] having the property: ∀i ∈
[1,m]. m(i) =
1
m . We write states of MDPs as configurations
of some given set of variables V . Given a state s and a variable
v ∈ V , we write s.v to denote the value of the variable in that
state. Given two states s and s′ and a set of variables V ,
we write s ≡V s′ meaning that the values of variables in V
are the same in both states: ∀v ∈ V. s.v = s′.v. Given a
labeling L : S → 2AP, we say that L is invariant w.r.t. V iff
∀s, s′ ∈ S. s ≡V s′ ⇒ L(s) = L(s′).
Given MDPsM1 andM2, we will denote withM1 ‖ M2
the MDP resulting from their synchronous composition.
Let us list the graphical conventions used in this work to
depict MDPs (see Fig. 1 and following):
• the circles represent the values of variables pcc or pca;
• transitions have labels of the form: {p}[α]γ where p ∈
[0, 1] is the probability, α is the action, and γ is a boolean
formula mentioning the variables of the state.
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Fig. 1. The MDP CLIENT
For the sake of brevity, we use notation ∃i ∈ [a, b].
{p(i)}[α]γ(i) as transition label, to denote a group of (b −
a + 1) similar transitions, each obtained by replacing i with
one of the natural values in the interval [a, b]. Following the
PRISM notation, the boolean formula on a transition can refer
to variables in the source state by their name (e.g. ctrc), and
to variables in the target state by their primed name (e.g. ctr′c).
B. The client
Let CLIENT be the MDP encoding the client process de-
scribed earlier (see Fig. 1). It has the following local variables:
• pcc : track the progress of the process,
• sc : the identifier of the next recipient server/provider,
• ctrc : the total number of sent slices,
• ctric : the number of slices sent to server/provider i.
The MDP has a first block of m transitions from pcc = 0
to pcc = 1 picking a storage server (or provider) to store the
slice; each transition is subject to some probability pi. Next,
the client either sends the slice to the selected recipient, if
the latter has not reached its capacity, or it tries again picking
another one. A total slice counter and a server/provider slice
counter are increased whenever the slice is sent. The loop
terminates when all the slices are sent.
Let us remark that the sending transition is labeled with
a special action busy. This is used when building the syn-
chronous composition of CLIENT with the MDP modeling the
intruder, to synchronize the action of sending by the client and
the action of intercepting by the intruder.
C. The slice attacker
Let us name SLICEATT the MDP encoding the first type of
intruder. The reason for its name is that it tries to intercept
every slice, independently from the previously intercepted
ones. The intruder is given in Fig. 2. It has two local variables,
viz. pca and ctra. The former tracks the progress of the attack,
while the latter counts the number of intercepted slices at any
given moment.
The figure shows that the attack progresses linearly: it
starts by intercepting the first k1 slices, each with probability
ai given that the slice is sent to server/provider i. Having
intercepted less than k1 slices, there is no possibility to
reconstruct the message body. After intercepting k1 slices the
next chain of states repeatedly alternate these steps: first it
tries to reconstruct the message body with probability xj ,
given j = ctra; if it fails it tries to intercept a new slice.
The state pca = done denotes that the intruder reconstructed
the message body.
D. The provider attacker
Let PROVIDERATT be the MDP encoding the second type
of intruder. The reason for its name is that it tries to obtain the
credentials of the storage provider, and later it will intercept
all the slices traveling towards that provider.
The intruder is depicted in Fig. 3. It has two local variables,
viz. pca and ctra. Similarly to the previous intruder, the former
variable models the progress of the attack, while the latter
counts the number of intercepted slices.
The intruder has an initial chain of m states where it tries
to attack every provider tossing a coin with probability ai; if
the attack is successful it sets a flag attia for provider i. State
pca = m is reached when all attack attempts are decided
(some succeeded and some failed). In a loop the attacker
synchronizes with the busy action from the client that is
sending a message, to intercept every slice sent to an attacked
provider. From state (pca = m, ctra = j) there is a transition
to some state with pc = done labeled with probability xj ,
meaning that it has probability xj to reconstruct the content
of the message, given j intercepted slices.
III. PARAMETRIC FORMAL VERIFICATION
In Section II we have seen that the problem at our hands is
intrinsically parametric. The model checking problem requires
its input MDP to be finite, thus we must fix the system
parameters. On the other hand, this means that the outcome of
our formal verification holds only for the specific configuration
of the parameters themselves. One of the common desiderata
when doing parametric formal verification, is to prove univer-
sal properties, i.e. we should check whether some property
holds for any configuration of parameters. In this work we
are able to measure the confidentiality of dispersal algorithms
for any number of storage providers in presence of a slice
attacker, while in the case of the provider attacker the degree
of confidentiality depends on the actual number of storage
providers in the network. Before showing the detailed formal
analysis, we report the needed formal ingredients.
A. Preliminaries
PCTL? is a temporal logic for describing qualitative and
quantitative aspects of probabilistic systems. The grammar of
PCTL? formulae is the following:
Φ ::= true | p | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | PJ(ϕ)
ϕ ::= Φ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | Xϕ | Gϕ | Fϕ
0 1 2 1 2 · · ·
done
∃i ∈ [1,m].{ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k1 − 1∧
ctr′a = k1
∃i ∈ [1,m].{ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra < k1 − 1∧
ctra = ctr′a + 1
∃i ∈ [1,m].
{1− ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra < k1
{1− xk1}
{xk1}
∃i ∈ [1,m].{ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k1∧
ctr′a = k1 + 1∃i ∈ [1,m].
{1− ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k1
{1− xk1+1}
{xk1+1}
∃i ∈ [1,m].{ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k1 + 1∧
ctr′a = k1 + 2∃i ∈ [1,m].
{1− ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k1 + 1
∃i ∈ [1,m].{ai}[busy]
sc = i ∧ ctra = k2 − 1∧
ctr′a = k2
ctra = 0
Fig. 2. The MDP SLICEATT
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{am}attma = 1
[busy]
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[busy]
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. . .
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Fig. 3. The MDP PROVIDERATT
where p ∈ AP and J ⊆ [0, 1] is a rational interval. Terms of
Φ are state formulae, while terms of ϕ are path formulae.
A thorough description of the logic satisfiability relation is
beyond the aims of this paper, since the subject is covered by
several textbooks (e.g. see [8, Ch. 10.4]). Intuitively, formula
Gϕ holds w.r.t. some path iff every state visited in the path
satisfies the sub-formula ϕ. Formula Fϕ, instead, holds w.r.t.
some path iff some visited state satisfies sub-formula ϕ. The
state formula P[a,b](ϕ) holds w.r.t. state s iff the sub-formula
ϕ holds in all paths starting from s with some probability
p ∈ [a, b]. Given an MDP M, let us write M |= Φ to express
that all the initial states of M satisfy the property Φ.
Given a PCTL? path formula ϕ and an MDP M, there
exist polynomial time algorithms computing the minimum and
maximum probabilities of ϕ w.r.t. all the initial states of M
[8, Ch. 10.6]. In the following we will write Pmin(ϕ,M) and
Pmax(ϕ,M) to denote such computed probabilities. 1
From the definitions of M |= Φ, Pmin and Pmax, the
following fact holds immediately.
Proposition 1 ([8, Ch. 10.6]). Given any MDPM, any PCTL?
path formula ϕ, and any 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1, then:
M |= P[a,b]ϕ ⇐⇒ a ≤ Pmin(ϕ,M) ∧ b ≥ Pmax(ϕ,M)
1Note that, in general, given any PCTL? formula ϕ and MDP M, it is
possible that Pmin(ϕ,M) 6= Pmax(ϕ,M). This is a consequence of the
sequence of non-deterministic choices that can be taken in the executions
of M, each leading to a (possibly) different probability outcome associated
to ϕ. This motivates the interest in discovering the minimum and maximum
probabilities with which ϕ holds in M.
Example 1. Assume two MDPsM1 := CLIENT ‖ SLICEATT
and M2 := CLIENT ‖ PROVIDERATT. Assume a proposition
HACKED ∈ AP and labeling L1 of M1 (resp. L2 of M2)
such that HACKED ∈ L1(s) (resp. HACKED ∈ L2(s)) iff
s.pca = done. We can measure the likelihood of breaking
the confidentiality requirement of M1 (resp. M2) computing
Pmin(F (HACKED),M1) and Pmax(F (HACKED),M1) (resp.
Pmin(F (HACKED),M2) and Pmax(F (HACKED),M2)).
Due to Proposition 1, the probabilistic model checking
problem may assume two different flavours:
• qualitative: take as input an MDP M and a formula Φ,
and return true iff M |= Φ;
• quantitative: take as input an MDPM and a path formula
ϕ, and compute Pmin and Pmax.
Here we use the quantitative probabilistic model checking.
Given an MDP M, one can show that two states s and
s′ are indistinguishable, from a probabilistic point of view,
if (i) every step taken from s is mimicked by some step
taken from s′, (ii) both steps end in equivalent states, and
(iii) the viceversa is also true. This is captured by the notion
of probabilistic bisimulation.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic Bisimulation, [8, Ex. 10.27]).
Given an MDP (S,Act, P r, ι, L), a probabilistic bisimulation
is an equivalence relation R ⊆ S × S such that, for any
s, s′ ∈ S, R(s, s′) iff:
• L(s) = L(s′), and
• Pr(s, α,X) = Pr(s′, α,X), ∀α ∈ Act, X ∈ S/R
where S/R represents the quotient set of S by R.
Given two states s, t, let us write s ≈R t if R(s, t) for some
probabilistic bisimulation R. When R is clear from the context,
we may omit it. The given definition of probabilistic bisimula-
tion helps establishing that two states of the same MDP cannot
be distinguished. It is possible to use probabilistic bisimulation
to check whether different MDPs are indistinguishable. Given
two MDPs, M1 = (S1,Act1, P r1, ι1, L1) and M2 = (S2,
Act2, P r2, ι2, L2), let S := S1unionmultiS2 be the disjoint union of the
state sets. Let us write M1 ≈RM2 iff AP1 = AP2 and there
exists a bisimulation relation R ⊆ S × S and ι1(X) = ι2(X)
for each X ∈ S/R. It is known that bisimilar MDPs satisfy the
same PCTL? formulae.
Theorem 1 ([8, Ex. 10.27]). Given two MDPs M1 and M2
such that M1 ≈ M2, then M1 |= Φ iff M2 |= Φ, for any
Φ ∈ PCTL?.
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 yield the following.
Corollary 1. Given two MDPs M1,M2 such that M1 ≈
M2 and any PCTL? path formula ϕ, then Pmin(ϕ,M1) =
Pmin(ϕ,M2) and Pmax(ϕ,M1) = Pmax(ϕ,M2).
B. Parameter abstraction for the slice attacker
Let us consider the MDPMslice = CLIENT ‖ SLICEATT. In
order to generalize our verification for any number of storage
servers, we group the latter in channels, i.e. collections of
servers that are indistinguishable.
Formally we define a channel as a triple (x, g, a) where
x ∈ N>0 is the number of servers in the channel, g : [1, x]→
[0, 1] is a probability distribution and a ∈ [0, 1] is a probability
value. Intuitively, x is the number of storage servers belonging
to the channel, g is the probability distribution of picking any
server in the channel when sending a slice, conditioned by the
fact that the current channel has been chosen, and a is the
probability of attacking any server belonging to the channel.
It is easy to see that if a channel has size one, it can only be
defined as follows: (1, 1, a), for some a ∈ [0, 1].
In this analysis we assume that any storage server can host
any number of slices. We also fix a subset of the model
variables: V = {pcc, ctrc,pca, ctra}.
Given an Markov Decision Process M, let us write
Mf ((x1, g1, a1), . . . , (xk, gk, ak)) denoting a copy of it where
storage servers are grouped in the given k channels.
Our claim is that if we check formulae that look only at
variables in V (and in particular that do not look at variables
sc and ctric, for i ∈ [1,m]), then a system with one server per
channel is indistinguishable from a system with an arbitrary
number of servers per channel. This means that the number
of channels in the system defines an upper limit, or cutoff, to
the size of the model to be verified.
Theorem 2. Fix a positive number k and any probabil-
ity distribution f : [0, k] → [0, 1]. For all n1, . . . , nk ∈
N>0, distribution probabilities gj : [0, nj ] → [0, 1]
(j ∈ [1, k]), probability values a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1],
let M1 = Mslicef ((1, 1, a1), . . . , (1, 1, ak)) and M2 =
Mslicef ((n1, g1, a1), . . . , (nk, gk, ak)). Let L1 and L2 be the
respective labeling functions, and assume they are invariant
with respect to V . Then: M1 ≈M2.
For the sake of readability, the detailed proofs can be found
in the appendix of this paper.
Next corollary follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Given M1 and M2 as of Theorem 2, then for
all Φ ∈ PCTL?:
M1 |= Φ ⇐⇒ M2 |= Φ
C. Variable abstraction for the provider attacker
Here we focus on the scenario in which the intruder can
break one or more providers, thus accessing all the slices
they store. Two applicative examples of this scenario are
the cooperative storage systems, where each node joining the
network can receive some of the slices, and the interconnected
cloud, where a client may decide to split the message among
several cloud storage providers. In the latter case we ignore
the fact the cloud storage provider may further distribute the
received slices among its own servers, and treat each such
provider as a single server.
The model checking problem: Pmin(ϕ,CLIENT ‖
PROVIDERATT), where ϕ encodes our confidentiality require-
ments, remains a problem parameterized by the actual numbers
of storage providers (similarly for Pmax).
On the other side, one can easily see that if every provider
can host any number of slices (i.e. c ≥ n) we can produce an
indistinguishable model that is much smaller w.r.t. the original
one, by simply dropping the variables W = {ctric : i ∈ [1,m]}
from the local state of CLIENT. This reduces the problem to a
feasible one, allowing us to experimentally measure the degree
of confidentiality of the considered dispersal algorithm w.r.t.
the number of slices n and the number of providers m. Call
V the set of remaining variables (i.e. V ∩W = ∅).
Name CLIENT′ a copy of CLIENT whose state does not
contain variables in W . Intuitively, this means that CLIENT′
does not check whether a provider reached its capacity, but
this is not a limitation since we assumed that every storage
provider can host any number of slices.
Theorem 3. Assume MDPs M1 = CLIENT ‖ PROVIDERATT
and M2 = CLIENT′ ‖ PROVIDERATT. Let L1 and L2 be the
respective labeling functions, and assume they are invariant
with respect to V . Then: M1 ≈M2.
Corollary 3. Given M1 and M2 as of Theorem 3, then for
all Φ ∈ PCTL?:
M1 |= Φ ⇐⇒ M2 |= Φ
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Here we show how to use model checking for measuring the
likelihood of breaking the confidentiality requirement against
systems of growing sizes. In particular the parameter n is
increased among runs. We remark that any cloud system is
characterized by its own sets of parameters (e.g. the probabil-
ities of attacking the used providers may be part of their SLA).
In our experiments we choose parameters arbitrarily, mainly
for showing the feasibility of the approach and underlining the
weakness of data dispersal algorithms in some cloud environ-
ment , viz. interconnected clouds. The checked specifications
are taken from Example 1.
Thanks to the parametric abstractions explained in Section
III, the verification outcomes using the intruder SLICEATT
hold no matter the number of storage servers/providers in
the system. In the case of intruder PROVIDERATT the results
depend on the number of storage providers in the network.
The experiments were run on a machine Xeon Quad Core
2.3 Ghz with 8 GB RAM and Linux 2.6.32 64 bit. The
points in the graphs correspond to distinct instances of the
model checking problem, all requiring from few seconds to
60 minutes to complete.
In the first set of experiments we compare two different
types of dispersal algorithms, those based on RS transforms
against those based on LT transforms. For this analysis we
fixed the number of channels/providers to 3 and the attacking
probabilities to a1 = 0.1, a2 = 0.2, and a3 = 0.3. In the RS
case we assumed k1 = k2 = 0.7 · n, while in the LT case we
assumed k1 = 0.6 · n and k2 = 0.8 · n. In the case of the
LT transforms we assumed that the sequence of probabilities
xj , for j ∈ [k1, n] is defined as follows: let δ = 1k2−k1+1 ,
xj = (min(j, k2) − k1 + 1) · δ. Intuitively, probabilities xj
grow linearly in the interval [k1, k2 − 1] and then stabilize at
1 for values greater than or equal to k2 .
In Fig. 4 and 5 we depict how the probability of breaking
the confidentiality requirement varies w.r.t. n. Let us remark
that Pmax and Pmin versions of the formula coincide in every
point of the series. We also notice that the algorithm (under
the given parameters) shows a high degree of confidentiality
against SLICEATT, while it is sensibly less confidential against
PROVIDERATT. Moreover, the confidentiality in the latter case,
after some initial change, stabilizes and does not depend on
the actual number of exchanged slices. The latter observation
is not surprising since the intruder mainly attacks providers,
and few providers will receive many slices, thus giving the
intruder a high probability of guessing the message body.
The second block of experimental data compares the effect
of different attack probabilities, viz. a1 = 0.1, a2 = 0.2, and
a3 = 0.3 (see Low) vs. a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.4, and a3 = 0.5
(see High). For this analysis we used only LT transforms and
we fixed the number of channels/providers to 3. As before,
k1 = 0.6 · n and k2 = 0.8 · n and the series xj grows
linearly as for the previous experiment. Fig. 6 and 7 summarize
the model checking outcomes. As would be expected, higher
probabilities of intercepting slices give the data dispersal
algorithm a very low level of confidentiality against intruder
SLICEATT. Again, the low number of providers causes a low
degree of confidentiality against intruder PROVIDERATT.
Finally, a third set of experiments compares the effects of
different numbers of channels/providers in the system and
the results are given in Fig. 8 and 9. In both cases a LT
transform was used, with k1 = 0.6 · n and k2 = 0.8 · n.
In one case we assumed 5 channels/providers in the network
(see m5) and in the other 10 channels/providers (see m10).
The probabilities ai, for i ∈ [1,m], are distributed uniformly
in the interval [0, 0.25] in both cases. xj is defined as for
the previous experiment. Once again the degree of confiden-
tiality against PROVIDERATT is considerably lower than that
against SLICEATT. We underline that the experiment with 10
providers could be verified only for a small number of slices
(n ≤ 150), before running out of memory. Even though this
fact represents a scalability issue of the presented methodol-
ogy, the verification outcomes are still of practical interest
since interconnected (or federated) cloud solutions usually
employ a limited number of storage providers. Confidentiality
of data dispersal with a small number of storage nodes appears
to be too weak against attacks directed to the storage provider.
V. RELATED WORK
Formal verification of security requirements has a long
history. In this area, model checking plays a predominant
role [9], [10], [11], [12]. The traditional approaches consist in
model checking the security requirements of a system opposed
to an adversary able to intercept, remove, modify the original
messages as well as to inject new messages. In this respect, the
Dolev-Yao intruder model [13] is considered the most general
model (the worst case) [14] as it assumes a non-deterministic
attacker in full control of the communication channels.
Traditional model checking, though, is not suitable for
verifying security of cloud systems: it can only verify whether
a system can be attacked or not. We assume, instead, that
every component of a cloud system can be attacked with some
degree of probability, and are more interested in measuring
the likelihood of such attacks. This motivated us to define
custom probabilistic intruder models, in place of the Dolev-
Yao intruder. To the best of our knowledge, few authors
used probabilistic model checking for measuring security of
systems [15], [16], [17], [18].
It is well known that model checking techniques must face
the state-explosion problem, that easily makes the verification
of real-world protocols and systems unfeasible. To overcome
this limitation, one looks for abstraction techniques [19] that
reduce the description of the system to a feasible state-
space, still preserving the relevant properties. Special forms of
abstractions are required when the system state-space depends
on given parameters and one wants to check whether some
property holds for all values of such parameters [20], [21].
With regards to probabilistic models, several approaches use
abstraction techniques. Legay et al. [22] and Nouri et al. [23],
for example, collect traces of real or simulated systems. Next
they sample them in order to build an MDP that abstracts the
original system. Such technique avoids to build a complete
analysis of all the traces for large-scale (or even infinite)
systems. The larger is the sample, on the other side, the higher
is the probability that the verification outcomes are correct.
Fig. 4. Compare AONT-RS vs. AONT-LT using SLICEATT Fig. 5. Compare AONT-RS vs. AONT-LT using PROVIDERATT
Fig. 6. Compare channel probability of attack using SLICEATT Fig. 7. Compare provider probability of attack using PROVIDERATT
Fig. 8. Compare different number of channels using SLICEATT Fig. 9. Compare different number of providers using PROVIDERATT
Herd et al. [24], instead, proposed a trace sampling technique
combined with trace fragmentation, i.e. only few fragments of
a trace are considered. Abate et al. [25] proposed a method
for transforming an MDP with an uncountable number of
states into a Markov chain by means of a quotient-set based
abstraction. The paper proves that the produced Markov chain
approximates a probabilistic bisimulation of the original MDP.
Finally, let us remark that also the structure of the attacker
may determine the feasibility of the verification of security
properties. In our work we employed a passive intruder model,
and indeed several authors agree that this is enough when
analyzing confidentiality requirements. For example, Li and
Pang [26], and Shmatikov [15] used passive intruders to verify
anonymity of protocols, a special case of confidentiality. The
latter work also considers probabilistic attacks. As far as we
know, the use of a probabilistic passive attacker model for the
analysis of data confidentiality is original.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a unified framework for the probabilistic
model checking of a broad class of data dispersal algorithms
in interconnected or cooperative cloud storage systems.
We verified confidentiality requirements of dispersal algo-
rithms, checking the likelihood that an intruder has of inter-
cepting slices of information and reconstruct the information.
In our framework we defined two types of probabilistic
intruder, one tries to intercept each slice independently and
the other attempts to attack the storage provider. In the former
case the attack surface is the set of slices while in the latter it
is the set of providers.
The problem is inherently parametric, since the CPU time
and memory required to complete the verification are highly
affected by several parameters, e.g. the number of slices used
to split the information and the number of servers/providers.
By proving a probabilistic bisimulation property, we were
able to generalize the results of the verification of confiden-
tiality against the slice attacker to any number of servers in
the network. The key observation, codified in our channel
abstraction, is that any group of servers sharing the same
probability of being eavesdropped may form a channel and
behave like a single server hosting all the slices.
The analysis of the confidentiality against the provider
attacker suggests, on the contrary, that classic data dispersal
algorithms may not be the best solution to ensure confidential-
ity in interconnected cloud environments, unless the number
of storage providers is considerably high.
We should remark that the conducted experiments fix some
parameters to specific values. The conclusions thus are not
fully generalizable w.r.t. such parameters. Among the modifi-
able parameters we remark that only k1 and k2 affect the state
space and thus the complexity of the model checking problem.
We leave as future research the investigation of better
abstractions suitable for the verification of the confidentiality
of data dispersal algorithms against PROVIDERATT on net-
works with many storage providers. That would improve the
scalability of our framework to handle the case of cooperative
storage systems.
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APPENDIX
Corollary 1. Given two MDPs M1,M2 such that M1 ≈
M2 and any PCTL? path formula ϕ, then Pmin(ϕ,M1) =
Pmin(ϕ,M2) and Pmax(ϕ,M1) = Pmax(ϕ,M2).
Proof: Assume MDPs M1 and M2 such that M1 ≈
M2, and any path formula ϕ ∈ PCTL?. Let us name
a = Pmin(ϕ,M1) and a′ = Pmin(ϕ,M2). Assume, by
contradiction and w.l.o.g., that a > a′ ≥ 0.
It is immediate that some a ≤ b ≤ 1 must exist such that:
M1 |= P[a,b](ϕ), thus M2 |= P[a,b](ϕ) (by Theorem 1).
As we observed earlier (see Proposition 4), by definition of
the model checking problem PCTL?, Pmin and Pmax (see e.g.
[8]), the following holds:M |= P[x,y](ϕ) iff x ≤ Pmin(ϕ,M)
and y ≥ Pmax(ϕ,M), for any MDPM, PCTL? path formula
ϕ and rationals 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1.
In our case, and from M2 |= P[a,b](ϕ), it follows that:
a ≤ Pmin(ϕ,M2) = a′
which in turn contradicts our assumption a > a′. This proves
that Pmin(ϕ,M1) = Pmin(ϕ,M2).
Using a symmetric argument, it is straightforward to
prove that, given the corollary assumptions, Pmax(ϕ,M1) =
Pmax(ϕ,M2).
Theorem 2. Fix a positive number k and any probabil-
ity distribution f : [0, k] → [0, 1]. For all n1, . . . , nk ∈
N>0, distribution probabilities gj : [0, nj ] → [0, 1]
(j ∈ [1, k]), probability values a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1],
let M1 = Mslicef ((1, 1, a1), . . . , (1, 1, ak)) and M2 =
Mslicef ((n1, g1, a1), . . . , (nk, gk, ak)). Let L1 and L2 be the
respective labeling functions, and assume they are invariant
with respect to V . Then: M1 ≈M2.
Proof: Let n :=
∑k
i=1 ni. Let H : [1, n] → [1, k] be
a surjective mapping. Intuitively, H(j) = i iff j belongs to
the i-th channel. If for some j, k, H(j) = H(k) it means
that (pj , qj) = (pk, qk), i.e. they belong to the same channel,
and we will write j =H k. In this proof we call transition
template a PRISM transition, possibly with indexed variables.
Let us call Θ the set of the above transition templates. Given
any θ ∈ Θ and a state s, we write θ(s) to denote the actual
MDP transition obtained by instantiating the variables in θ
with their values in state s. It is evident that for any θ and s
there exists a unique target state s′. For example: let θ be an
indexed PRISM transition [α]fooi = 1→ p : foo′i = 2, and an
MDP state s such that s.foo1 = 1 and s.foo2 = 1, then θ(s)
is the MDP transition: (s, p, α, s′) such that s′.foo1 = 2, and
s′.foo2 = 2.
Given a transition τ = (s, α, p, s′) ∈ Pr we will denote
with pre(τ) the source state s and with post(τ) the target
state s′.
Name S1 the set of states of M1, S2 the set of states of
M2, and S their disjoint union. Let us define the relation
R ⊆ S × S as follows: R(s1, s2) iff the following properties
hold:
• s1 ≡V s2
• s1.sc =H s2.sc
• ∀i ∈ [1,m]. s1.ctr1i =
∑ni
j=1 s2.ctr
j
i
In order to show that R is a probabilistic bisimulation, let
us first observe that R is an equivalence relation (i.e. it is
transitive, reflexive and symmetric).
Secondly, let us underline that L(s1) = L(s2) follows by
our definition of AP and the fact that ∀v ∈ V. s1.v = s2.v.
Finally, let us show that: Pr(s1, α,X) = Pr(s2, α,X), for
all X ∈ S/R and all α ∈ Act.
Let us consider two cases: either (C1) X = [s1]R, or (C2)
X 6= [s1]R. Notice that by definition of X and R, [s1]R =
[s2]R.
Case (C1) is possible iff there is a transition τ satisfying all
the following conditions:
• pre(τ) ≡V post(τ) i.e. τ does not change any variable
v ∈ V (otherwise s1, s2 6∈ X);
• ∀i ∈ [1, n]. pre(τ) ≡{ctri} post(τ), i.e. τ does not change
any counter (otherwise the counters can only increase,
thus their sum increase, and thus s1, s2 6∈ X);
• either pre(τ) = post(τ) or pre(τ) 6≡{sc} post(τ) i.e. it is
either a self-loop or it changes variable sc.
Inspecting all the transitions in the model, there is none that
satisfies the above conditions, thus this case is impossible.
Let us split case (C2) in subcases. Either (C2.1) X differs
from [s1] only for variables in V , or (C2.2) X differs from
[s1] for variables in V ∪ {ctri, sc}.
Case (C2.1) is possible for the following transition tem-
plates:
• any transition of SLICEATT, or
• the CLIENT transition template: (pcc = 0, ctrc = n) →
(pc′c = 3, sc = 0)
Let us observe the following facts, for any θ ∈ Θ:
• ∃q1 ∈ X, p ∈ [0, 1]. θ(s1) = (s1, p, α, q1) ⇒ ∃q2 ∈
X. θ(s2) = (s2, p, α, q2);
• ∃q2 ∈ X, p ∈ [0, 1]. θ(s2) = (s2, p, α, q2) ⇒ ∃q1 ∈
X. θ(s1) = (s1, p, α, q1);
This means, intuitively, that whenever τ is applicable to state
s1 and reaching some state q1 ∈ X , it is also applicable to the
equivalent state (by R) s2 and reaches some state q2 equivalent
to q1. This can be proven checking all transition templates in
Θ: their final statuses q1, q2 have the same values for variables
in V and they didn’t change the values of variables {sc, ctri}
w.r.t. s1, s2. Since the correspondence preserves the value of
probability p, it follows that:
Pr(s1, α,X) =
∑
q∈X,θ∈Θ,
θ(s1)=(s1,p,q)
p
=
∑
q′∈X,θ′∈Θ,
θ′(s2)=(s2,p,q′)
p = Pr(s2, α,X)
Case (C2.2): X differs from [s1] for variables in V and for
variables in {sc, ctric}. The possible transition templates in this
case are all CLIENT templates:
• [busy](pcc = 1, sc = i, ctr
i
c < c) → (pc′c = 0, ctr′c =
ctrc + 1, s′c = 0)
• (pcc = 0, ctrc < n)→ pi : (pc′c = 1, sc = i)
In the case of the first template again we can directly check
that:
• ∃q1 ∈ X, p ∈ [0, 1]. θ(s1) = (s1, p, α, q1) ⇒ ∃q2 ∈
X. θ(s2) = (s2, p, α, q2);
• ∃q2 ∈ X, p ∈ [0, 1]. θ(s2) = (s2, p, α, q2) ⇒ ∃q1 ∈
X. θ(s1) = (s1, p, α, q1);
Take all transitions induced by the first template: the final
statuses satisfy the property q1 ≡W s1 and q2 ≡W s2, where
W = V ∪ {sc}. When variable ctrjc changes, for some j, it
increases by one. In this case the same template θ can be
applied to state s2 and variable ctrhc can increase its value by
one (with same probability) for some other channel h, such
that h =H j.
In the case θ is the second template, let us call n =
∑k
i=1 ni,
i.e. n represents the total number of servers belonging to some
channel in the system. Let us define the set As = {τ : τ ∈
θ,∃q. Pr(s, α, q) > 0}, i.e. As contains all the transitions that
are enabled in s and are induced by template θ. Let us define
the sets: Ais = {τ : τ ∈ θ, τ = (s, p, α, q), p > 0,
〈
ctrjc < c
〉 ∈
guard(τ), j =H i}. We have that:
As =
n⋃
i=1
Ais
Being in this case, s1 and s2 are the states where transition of
template θ is enabled and picks a channel to send the slice to.
We can observe that: |Ais1 | = 1 and |Ais2 | = ni, for any i ∈
[1, k]. Intuitively: by definition, in the small system we have
only one possible concrete transition that picks a server from
channel i, while in the big system we have ni concrete transi-
tions each choosing a different server from channel i. Thus, we
can write that: Ais1 = {(s1, p, α, q)}, for some p ∈ [0, 1] and
q ∈ S1, and Ais2 = {(s1, p1, α, q1), . . . , (s1, pni , α, qni)}, for
some p1, . . . , pni ∈ [0, 1] s.t.
∑ni
j=1 pj = p, and q1, . . . , qni ∈
S2.
Finally, we can show that, for all i:
Pr(s1, α,X) = Pr(s1, α, q) = p
=
∑ni
j=1 Pr(s2, α, qj)
=
∑ni
j=1 pj = Pr(s2, α,X)
In fact:
∑ni
j=1 pj =
∑
j gi(j) · f(i) = f(i) ·
∑
j gi(j) = f(i),
since 1 =
∑
j gi(j), by our assumptions.
Theorem 3. Assume MDPs M1 = CLIENT ‖ PROVIDERATT
and M2 = CLIENT′ ‖ PROVIDERATT. Let L1 and L2 be the
respective labeling functions, and assume they are invariant
with respect to V . Then: M1 ≈M2.
Proof: First of all, let us observe that variables ctric is
always compared with parameter c, the storage capacity. Since
by assumption c > n, for all n ∈ N>0, this guard can always
be dropped from CLIENT as it is a tautology. What remains
is a MDP that updates the variables ctric but never reads it.
The MDP CLIENT′ is identical to CLIENT, except that it
does not update the variables ctric. It is immediate to see that
every transition enabled in CLIENT must be enabled also in
CLIENT′, and viceversa.
Name S1 the set of states ofM1, and S2 the set of states of
M2, and name S = S1unionmultiS2 their disjoint union. Let us define
the relation R ⊆ S×S as follows: R = {(s1, s2) : s1 ≡V s2}.
By our assumptions, L1 and L2 are invariant w.r.t. variables
in V , meaning that s1 ≡V s2 ⇒ L1(s1) = L2(s2). Combined
with definition of R we have that R(s1, s2) ⇒ L1(s1) =
L2(s2).
Since every transition enabled in M1 is also enabled in
M2, and since they have the same probability, the second re-
quirement of a probabilistic bisimulation holds (see Definition
2).
